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Claims and achievements of the meta-structure
proposal
The authors of the seven meta-structure papers in this
issue have to be applauded for their inspiring attempt
to suggest and elaborate a new meta-structure of
mental disorders consisting of five ‘clusters ’. At first
sight this proposal seems to be considerably simpler
than the current diagnostic classifications structure
used by DSM-IV-TR (17 categories ; APA, 2000) and,
in some parts, more convergent with the ICD-10 (10
categories ; WHO, 1993). Against the background of
dissatisfaction expressed with the current diagnostic
classification structure for mental disorders and its
principles, the authors provide a selective critical re-
view of relevant research. In particular, evidence is
examined to address the question of whether current
individual mental disorders differ sufficiently from
each other and whether the current more fine-graded
distinction of specific mental disorders and their
grouping in 10 major classes according to ICD-10 and
17 in DSM-IV-TR is justified. To help answer this
question, a priori criteria were chosen in the form of a
wide range of ‘validators ’ grouped into so-called
‘causal ’ risk factors (i.e. shared genetic risk factors,
familiality, shared environmental risks, shared neural
substrates, shared biomarkers, shared temperamental
antecedents) and factors thought to be more likely to
reflect the clinical picture itself (shared abnormalities
of cognitive and emotional processing, symptom
similarity, rates of co-morbidity, course, treatment re-
sponse). The results of this impressive exploration are
interpreted to suggest a substantial reduction of
the current major classes to five clusters and a fairly
large residual category of disorders not yet assigned.
Particularly noteworthy examples for classificatory
changes associated with the proposed meta-structure
involve : the suggestion to group anxiety, somatoform
and depressive disorders together under the term
‘emotional disorders ’ ; the allocation of bipolar dis-
orders to the ‘psychotic cluster ’ ; and the formation of
a broad externalizing cluster that comprises substance
use disorders, some of the personality disorders and
impulse control disorders.
Several core motivations are presented by the
authors to justify their proposal. (1) Increased utility, to
the degree that the current system has been found to
be overly complicated and too complex for routine
care, in particular by non-specialists such as primary
care physicians. From this perspective, the proposed
meta-structure is also expected to provide consider-
able simplification for research and a better adoption
in routine care and public administration. (2) Increased
validity and advantages for research, in the sense that
the proposed grouping would move classification of
mental disorders away from one based purely on
symptomatology and closer to the current under-
standing of shared putative causal risk and clinical
factors identified in research. (3) Increased homogeneity
within clusters, in that the proposed meta-structure
would more appropriately highlight similarities rather
than subtle differences between our current specific
diagnoses.
Each article reviews the supporting evidence across
a wide range of areas stemming from the 11 pre-
determined validating criteria (see Andrews et al.
2009a). These 11 criteria are a more fine-graded ex-
tension of the five original core criteria suggested by
Robins & Guze (1970) for establishing the validity of a
diagnosis. Aiming for a less descriptive and more
aetiological classification structure, the authors claim
that particular emphasis was given to those factors
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thought to be ‘causal ’ risk factors (e.g. shared genetic
risk factors and shared neural substrates).
Taking into account the many existing diagnoses of
mental disorders and the extremely rich and often
fragmented research studies, undoubtedly each paper
does a very impressive job of not only reviewing
the available evidence but also carefully weighing
the pros and cons of including and excluding dis-
orders and the designation of disorders to clusters.
However, the exposition and the proposed meta-
structure also raises many questions and concerns
and leaves the author of this commentary puzzled in
many ways.
Primary appraisal : back to the 1950s – little new?
Three immediate and puzzling impressions arise upon
initial reflection of the proposed meta-structure when
it is compared to current and past ICDs and DSM-
IV-TR. The first is that we have stepped into the past.
As displayed in Table 1, the very broad ‘emotional
cluster ’, which lumps all depressive, anxiety, stress-
related and somatoform disorders and also avoidant
personality disorder together, and the ‘psychosis
cluster ’, which includes bipolar and schizotypical
personality disorder, resemble the neurotic–psychotic
distinction in ICD-6 (psychoses and psychoneurotic
disorders). Although largely consistent with the cur-
rent two-digit ICD-10 codes, this grouping not only
represents a substantial change from the current DSM
but also seems to be counterintuitive given the ex-
tremely rich research literature on specific ‘emotional ’
disorders and their differences with regard to at least
some of the ‘validators ’.
Similarly, the lumping of substance use disorders,
under the broad umbrella of externalizing disorders,
together with conduct, antisocial and borderline per-
sonality disorders and also impulse control disorders
is astonishing and resembles – with the exception
of intelligence – the ICD-6 grouping of ‘Disorders of
character, behavior and intelligence ’. After decades of
multifaceted substance use research based on highly
differentiated classification of substance use disorders
by substance class, short- and long-term compli-
cations, and the core phenomenon of addiction, one
is hard-pressed to accept the premise of the meta-
structure, that all substance use disorders could be
appropriately grouped under the term ‘externalizing ’.
Is there really no evidence for a separate substance use
cluster? Or could it be that the proposition is based
only on a particular set of literature limited to sub-
stance dependence?
The second impression is that, beyond the emo-
tional and externalizing clusters, there seems to be
little new. This impression arises despite the fact that,
at the molecular level, the grouping of disorders is
slightly different, as are the justifications. What was
previously ‘Disorders Usually First Diagnosed in
Infancy or Adolescence ’ in DSM has now become the
‘Neurodevelopmental cluster ’ ; ‘Delirium, Dementia,
Amnestic and Other Cognitive Disorders ’ are now
labelled the ‘Neurocognitive cluster ’ ; and ‘Schizo-
phrenia and psychotic disorders ’ are now the ‘Psy-
chotic cluster ’. However, it should be noted that,
across all clusters, some core diagnoses and well-
established major groups that would intuitively be
seen as separate clusters are in fact subsumed under
one new unusual label (e.g. mood and anxiety or
somatoform disorders under emotional) or moved
to other clusters (e.g. bipolar disorders to psychotic).
Although there seem to be some good reasons for their
grouping, some of these changes are not intuitively
clear and might give rise to some confusion.
A third impression is that the logic and procedure
chosen by the meta-structure group leaves many DSM
disorders unclassified (see Table 1). This occurs either
for conceptual reasons (e.g. departure of DSM-IV-TR
distinction of Axis I and Axis II disorders, and re-
striction to ‘primary mental disorders ’ disregarding
mental disorders due to a general medical condition),
because of a lack of research data (e.g. elimination
disorders, tics, some personality disorders, body dys-
morphic, factitious, dissociative disorders, sleep dis-
orders, sexual and gender identity disorders), or for
unknown reasons (e.g. the majority of substance use-
related disorders, except substance dependence). The
large proportion of disorders not yet assigned raises a
range of immediate concerns : Will those currently
omitted ultimately fit one of the proposed clusters?
Will further clusters be derived? Will some rare dis-
orders ultimately form new clusters based on separate
evidence and principles than those assigned already to
the five clusters?
Beyond these general and immediate impressions,
our initial enthusiasm was further reduced when con-
sidering the numerous limitations, some of which are
acknowledged in the introductory paper (Andrews
et al. 2009a). Core examples of the limitations include
the top-down approach, which seems to be strongly
and disproportionately driven by studies that have
examined the structure of mental disorders based on
co-morbidity using higher-order factor analysis, and
the entire lack of evidence that the proposed clusters
will be useful in research and practice. These concerns
prompt the question of whether the proposed meta-
structure is indeed a step forward to an improved
classification structure that could be described as ‘a
more parsimonious meta-organization … (of the
mental disorders emphasizing) … risk factors, increas-
ing clinical utility and potentiate research into the
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Table 1. The classification of mental disorders from ICD-6 (1948) to the proposed meta-structure clusters
ICD-6 (WHO, 1948)








303 Paranoia and paranoid states
304 Senile psychosis
305 Presenile psychosis
306 Psychosis with cerebral arteriosclerosis
307 Alcoholic psychosis
309 Other and unspecified psychoses
(310–318) Psychoneurotic disorders
310 Anxiety reaction w.o. somatic sxs




31X Psychoneurosis with somatic sxs
315 … affecting circulatory system
316 … affecting digestive system
317 … affecting other systems
318 … other, mixed and unspecified types
(320–326) Disorders of character,
behaviour and intelligence
320 Pathological personality (e.g. antisocial
personality)
321 Immature personality (e.g. emotional
instability)
322 Alcoholism
323 Other drug addiction
324 Primary childhood behaviour disorders
325 Mental deficiency
326 Other and unspecified character,
behaviour and intelligence disorders
F00–F09 : Organic, including symptomatic,
mental disorders
F10–F19 : Mental and behavioural disorders
due to psychoactive substance use
F20–F29 : Schizophrenia, schizotypal and
delusional disorders
F30–F39 : Mood [affective] disorders
F40–F48 : Neurotic, stress-related and
somatoform disorders
F50–F59 : Behavioural syndromes associated
with physiological disturbances and
physical factors
F60–F69 : Disorders of adult personality and
behaviour
F70–F79 : Mental retardation
F80–F89 : Disorders of psychological
development
F90–F98 : Behavioural and emotional
disorders with onset in childhood
and adolescence
F99 : Unspecified mental disorder
Disorders usually first diagnosed in
infancy or adolescence
Delirium, dementia and amnestic and
other cognitive disorders
Mental disorders due to a general
medical condition not elsewhere
classified
Substance-related disorders







Sexual and gender identity disorders
Eating disorders
Sleep disorders




Other conditions that may be a focus of
clinical attention
Cluster 2 : Neurodevelopmental disorders
Cluster 1 : Neurocognitive disorders
Not considered and assigned
Cluster 5 : Externalizing disorders
Cluster 3 : The psychoses
Cluster 4 : Emotional disorders
Cluster 4 : Emotional disorders






Cluster 5 : Externalizing disorders
Cluster 4 : Emotional disorders??
Cluster 5 : Externalizing disorders (partly)














cause and prevention of mental disorders ’ (Andrews
et al. 2009a). They also stimulate the alternative ques-
tion : Does the proposed meta-structure harbour
considerable potential for confusing and misleading
researchers and clinicians?
A secondary appraisal of the meta-structure :
general issues
On a more general level, we first want to consider
the motivation for suggesting the meta-structure, its
meaning, and its future role.
Technical harmonization?
Theoretically, revisions of a diagnostic classification
system should be driven by solid scientific evidence
for introducing necessary changes that improve the
core functions of a classificatory system. For example,
changes should improve communication in research
and practice and improve utility in terms of treatment,
intervention and prognosis. In reality, however, re-
visions are strongly driven by additional motivations,
such as the drive to be different from the past, political
concerns, and technical reasons. Bearing this in mind,
the meaning of the proposed meta-structure is not
entirely clear. Is it simply meant to simplify the
grouping of the disorders by significantly reducing
the number of major classes? This might indeed be
a worthwhile goal if it were simply for technical/
pragmatic reasons. The alphanumeric system of ICD
chapters, for example, only allows for 10 major groups
and it would be desirable if there was a greater con-
cordance with the current DSM-IV-TR classification,
which currently specifies 17. Such concordance would
reduce the potential for problems between the classi-
ficatory systems. Harmonization between the two
systems could simply occur by reducing the number
of DSM categories by a more or less arbitrary or
‘ technical ’ procedure that combined major DSM
groups ; in fact the current ICD-10 provides an
example, though imperfect, for this. Alternatively,
a more radical approach could be used, such as the
one suggested with the meta-structure proposal. If
such a ‘ technical harmonization’ is the primary in-
tention, then the meta-structure proposal would not
do any major harm because it allows individual diag-
noses to be retained, albeit under different umbrellas
within the meta-structures five clusters.
However, the current proposition mentions five
clusters, leaving open how the remaining slots will
be filled. This opens the dangerous possibility that
additional clusters will be added with other groups of
disorders, but without a similarly rigorous approach
used to derive the five meta-structure clusters sug-
gested in this issue. Alternatively, it is possible that
there will be only one residual class. Having been
involved in some of the ‘political negotiations ’ of past
DSM and ICD revisions, we assume the former will
happen, resulting in a mixed bag of classificatory
structures.
Deeper theoretical meaning and implication?
We struggled with the fact that the meta-structure
proposition was obviously intended to have a ‘dee-
per ’ meaning. All papers emphasize repeatedly that
the proposition ‘ is a step away from a classification
based on symptom picture alone’ (Andrews et al.
2009a) towards ‘a classification based on etiological
risk factors ’ (Andrews et al. 2009a). Across variations
in terminology, all papers emphasize the role of
‘causal risk’ factors or ‘spectrum’s phenotypic coher-
ence’ (Krueger & South, 2009) and suggest that
the findings move us towards a deeper aetiological
meaning. Within this context, the authors claim that
the emotional cluster disorders, for example, share
‘emotional dysregulation and negative emotionality ’
as core defining features whereas the externalizing
cluster disorders share ‘disinhibition ’. To the degree
that this is the case, significant concerns arise.
(a) Given that the evidence presented in favour of
the proposed clusters is selective and ‘biased’ towards
the similarities rather than the differences between
disorders, we question the claim that the meta-
structure will be helpful. How significant and sub-
stantial is the danger that the guiding principles will
misguide future research or even negatively impact
our clinical practice?
(b) The proposal is strongly driven by one theoreti-
cally and methodologically problematic approach,
namely explorations of higher-order factor analytic
methods. Based largely on studies of co-morbidity
patterns in the community, these studies suggest that
symptom and diagnostic data might be best grouped
into an internalizing factor (i.e. panic disorder, gen-
eralized anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, specific and
social phobia in addition to major depression and
dysthymia) and an externalizing factor (i.e. substance
dependence, conduct and antisocial personality dis-
orders). However, the authors of the meta-structure
papers should have also acknowledged the severe
limitations of this methodological approach and
the data upon which it is based (Wittchen et al. 1999,
2009). The most relevant limitations are the statistical
method, the lack of developmental stability, and the
lack of structural stability when additional disorders
are considered. In fact, these factor analytic studies
have been based on only some (maximum 12 dis-
orders) of the disorders considered for the five clusters
and only a minority of all DSM disorders. Therefore,
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the rationale and designation of additional disorders
above and beyond the factor analytic evidence re-
mains unclear in many sections.
(c) Alternative meta-structure approaches exclus-
ively based on single risk factor domains (e.g. neuro-
biological, familiality, shared specific environmental
factors), course and outcome or other perspectives
such as ‘staging of disorder progression’ (Shear et al.
2007), or functional–behavioural or linguistic con-
cepts (Hayes et al. 2001) were neither considered nor
explored systematically. The scientific evidence
presented in the meta-structure papers was always
‘ forced to fit ’ the top-down derived meta-structure
emphasizing similarities and ‘downplaying’ differ-
ences. How heavily should we weight the danger that
this strategy misses or discards important and mean-
ingful signals for core psychopathological mechan-
isms and processes?
(d) In many papers, we struggled with the authors’
use of the term ‘causal ’ risk factors. The overemphasis
on ‘causal ’ risk factors occurred to the exclusion
of other factors. Furthermore, the authors seem to
assume that the availability of family-genetic and
neurobiological evidence in many domains is tanta-
mount to causal proof for a mental disorder. This
seems to be overly optimistic. To date, for almost all
disorders there is little evidence for any causal factor
or mechanism that is both necessary and sufficient
for a specific mental disorder and even the status of
many measures as reliable ‘markers ’ is typically con-
troversial. Throughout the papers, the authors only
poorly address the degree to which these ‘neurobio-
logical ’ measures are merely correlates of disturb-
ances in cognition, emotion and behaviour inherent
in the respective condition considered and across all
mental disorders. Clearly, all mental disorders must
be associated with disturbances in neural mechanisms
but, with a few diagnostic exceptions, a core causal
role as precipitant is as questionable as it is for
psychological and environmental factors (see, for ex-
ample, Andrews et al. 2009b). It might be more ap-
propriate to assume that all these factors interact
dynamically and might all be responsible in a prob-
abilistic way at all times for all disorders in some way
or another. This, of course, is difficult to capture in
a structural appraisal of a diagnostic classification
system.
(e) Some of the major limitations of the meta-
structure proposal are addressed in the introductory
paper. These include the ‘ top-down’ approach,
lack of systematic reviews, lack of coherent and
comprehensive data supporting the proposed clusters,
incomplete and partly contradictory evidence in terms
of the 11 criteria, largely lacking proof-of-concept
information, lack of systematic exploration and testing
of alternative grouping, and the partly assumed
cluster membership of a diagnosis without data and
research evidence. Despite these understandable but
considerable limitations, the papers frequently seem to
overstate what they found in many places. Claims that
the data ‘validate ’ the clusters (Andrews et al. 2009a)
or that the meta-structure proposition relied on
(causal) risk factors and clinical factors and is thus
‘more parsimonious ’ (Andrews et al. 2009a) seem to
go much too far.
‘Deeper ’ practical implications?
Is the proposition meant to suggest or would its im-
plementation result in the deletion of certain groups of
disorders or even certain diagnoses from our research
and clinical practice agenda? To what degree is the
meta-structure meant to replace current diagnostic
practice by allowing the cluster labels to be used as a
sufficient global diagnostic substitute? To what degree
is it meant to reduce spurious co-morbidity, by as-
suming that ‘relevant ’ co-morbidity only exists be-
tween the five clusters? Although it is prominently
emphasized several times that the meta-structure is
not meant to delete disorders nor should the clusters
be seen as mutually exclusive, inconsistent claims and
suggestions for each of these aims can be found across
all papers. Given that these questions are not con-
sidered systematically, nor are the potential dangers
explored, we feel uncomfortable about the ultimate
goal, namely the actual use of the proposed meta-
structure and its implications for the field. And given
the very limited and exploratory evidence for the
clusters, adoption of the proposed meta-structure
seems premature. It is therefore disconcerting that
Andrews et al. (2009a) strongly advocate a major
broad-range research programme not only to explicate
the neurobiological and other cluster risk factors but
also to use the proposed meta-structure as a base for
research on treatment, prognosis, and even practice.
In terms of increased clinical utility, there is no ex-
planation of why the proposition would be expected
to have greater utility and validity compared to the
current DSM grouping. This is especially concerning
in that this ‘ fact ’ is explicitly stated in several papers.
For example, Andrews et al. (2009a) state that, for
internists and general practitioners, ‘ the clustering
will simplify an otherwise confusing system’. Yet the
papers do not specify how and why a simplification
will work, even when a specific diagnostic category
still needs to be reliably ascertained before deciding on
cluster membership. To be fair, the authors admit this
problem indirectly in other places when they state that
the utility should be tested and that primary proof of
concept studies are needed.
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Harmful effects?
The authors of this proposition fail to reflect on the
potentially significant negative side-effects. Leaving
aside the substantial gaps with regard to supporting
data, might the lumping of anxiety, somatoform and
depressive disorders under the very broad umbrella of
‘emotional cluster ’ revive the stigmatizing and other-
wise controversial concept of neurosis? The initial
beauty and simplicity of grouping mental disorders
into conditions that could be mainly characterized by
‘emotional dysregulation’, as in the emotional cluster,
and ‘disinhibition ’, as in the externalizing cluster,
does not protect against the revival of potentially
stigmatizing diagnostic group labels. Even worse,
such an organization carries an increased risk of losing
sight of research-based distinctions and considerably
different intervention needs of the specific anxiety,
depressive, somatoform and other ‘emotional cluster ’
disorders. It took two decades to communicate, albeit
sometimes too subtly, that diagnosing specific mental
disorder matters. For example, it is true that the cross-
sectional picture of a person with panic disorder with
past uncued panic attacks might not be that different
from agoraphobia, severe specific phobia, generalized
anxiety disorder or even depression with anxiety fea-
tures when considering presenting symptoms, dis-
tress, and associated neurobiological and behavioural
correlates. However, doesn’t the occurrence of initial
spontaneous panic attacks tell us something extremely
useful with regard to prognosis (Wittchen & Gloster,
2009 ; Wittchen et al. 2009) and to treatment? Isn’t
there persuasive evidence that panic disorder
without agoraphobia is a quite different ‘animal ’ from
panic disorder with agoraphobia (Wittchen et al.
2009)? How damaging will a broad cluster proposition
be in this respect if a ‘deeper ’ meaning is involved?
In addition, just as these authors suggest that prog-
ress is impeded by the current system’s failure to use
meta-structures, we must ask what progress might be
impeded if these meta-structures are incomplete or
incorrect. Intended or not, the diagnostic system will
always influence the field’s thinking about psycho-
pathology and treatment. Is it therefore wise to adopt a
meta-structure with a ‘deeper meaning’ that has not
been adequately tested?
Secondary appraisal : specific issues
Beyond the more general issues regarding the meta-
structure proposition, there is also a range of
important issues pertaining to some of the specific
clusters and the assignment of disorders. As an ex-
ample we focus on the presumably largest, namely
‘ the emotional ’ cluster. First, the label seems to be
misleading. There is little evidence that emotional
disturbances play a more significant role within this
cluster than cognitive, behavioural and physiological
factors. Furthermore, the exceedingly high overlap
of anxiety and depressive and somatoform disorders
with almost all other clusters (including the psy-
choses, the neurocognitive and externalizing cluster
disorders) that may occur primarily, concurrently or
secondary to all other cluster disorders makes it diffi-
cult for us to understand the justification for this broad
cluster and its label. Second, the lumping together of
anxiety, depressive and somatoform disorders seems
to reflect misguided emphasis on cross-sectional sub-
jective verbal phenomenological data (in this respect
the term negative affect might be more appropriate),
whereas the differential effects of course, develop-
mental, neurobiological and treatment evidence are
downplayed. Indeed, when examining the cited ref-
erences, it seems that the differences between dis-
orders in this cluster (e.g. abnormalities of cognitive
and emotional processing, familiality and treatment)
are greater than those observed between clusters.
Precedence in the decision to assign these hetero-
geneous conditions to one cluster seems to be more
driven by the common final pathway of presentation
of these conditions than by the actual data of the
course, treatment, familiality and cognitive and
emotional processing. Similar convergent evidence
could easily be found for the formation of at least
three clusters, for example primary anxiety, mood and
obsessive–compulsive spectrum or stress/trauma-
related disorders. Third, the placement of bipolar dis-
order in the psychotic cluster seems to be consistent
with a substantial body of evidence that some forms of
mood disorders might be more closely related to the
psychoses spectrum (or vice versa). Indeed, research
evidence suggests that both psychotic and mood dis-
orders can be grouped best on a continuum. However,
why single out bipolar and not ‘major depression with
psychotic features ’?
Conclusions
Will this new meta-structure make researchers and
clinicians in the mental health field happier? Is the
proposed meta-structure really more appropriately
based on ‘validators ’ and particularly those that are
assumed to be ‘causal ’ risk factors? Will it stimulate
better research? Will it improve clinical utility and
practicality in routine care? Will it improve treatment
and care?
After careful consideration and re-examination
of the evidence presented, we have come to the con-
clusion that all these questions have to be answered in
the negative. Even though the meta-structure series
reflects an almost ‘Herculean’ effort, as one of the
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authors described it, the outcome seems to be closer to
‘Sisyphean’ ! The research evidence presented clearly
signals that it is already extremely difficult to
comprehensively ‘validate ’ one single disorder. Why
should it be easier or even more feasible to validate
clusters of heterogeneous disorders? Given the sig-
nificant limitations of the approach and the current
lack of empirical support (unlikely to become avail-
able during the next few years), the proposed meta-
structure and its claims should be regarded as an
interesting exploration but not as a solid or promising
basis for the upcoming ICD-11 or DSM-V revisions.
If the intent and motivation of the authors would
have been more moderate – for example focusing pri-
marily on the technical aspect of reducing the number
of major groups of mental disorder without the overly
ambitious claims of a deeper meaning and increased
clinical utility – the proposed meta-structure would
be a helpful step. However, the proposal is not per-
suasive when evaluated against the initial aims of de-
veloping a more parsimonious meta-structure based
on risk factors and clinical factors and with the long-
term aim of improving clinical practice, adminis-
tration, research and even training and education. In
fact, it might even imply more risks for harm than
benefits in each of the domains. For example, it may
lead to an oversimplification of mental disorders,
premature adoption of putative risk factors, and dim-
inish recognition and treatment.
The proposed meta-structure, with its assumed
‘deeper implications ’, might also divert the attention
of the DSM-V and ICD-11 Task Forces from searching
for alternative approaches that might match re-
searchers’ and clinicians’ needs more appropriately.
In this respect, there is undoubted consensus that
future diagnostic classification systems should adopt
and incorporate meaningful dimensions and continua,
stipulate how they relate differentially to the full
spectrum of diagnoses, and how this information can
be incorporated in the necessarily dichotomous
decisions made in diagnostic classificatory systems
(Regier, 2007). Some of these dimensional additions
and conceptualization might be relevant to only one
disorder or a smaller group of related diagnoses.
Others will cut across diagnostic categories. Similar to
the ‘validators ’ of the meta-structure, these dimen-
sions could be conceptualized as diagnostic specifiers
in terms of (family) genetic factors, neural substrates
or biomarkers, temperamental antecedents, core
psychopathological features, basic psychological dys-
functions of cognition and affect and also course and
treatment response. It remains to be determined and
debated, however, which dimensions best capture
salient diagnostic and therapeutic questions from a
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